Abstract-We consider the well known Sliding Window Protocol which provides reliable and efficient transmission of data over unreliable channels. A formal proof of correctness for this protocol faces sub stantial difficulties, caused by a high degree of parallelism which creates a significant potential for errors. Here we consider a version of the protocol that is based on selective repeat of frames. The spec ification of the protocol by a state machine and its safety property are represented in the language of the verification system PVS. Using the PVS system, we give an interactive proof of this property of the Sliding Window Protocol.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the well known protocols for reliable transmission of data over unreliable channels is the Slid ing Window Protocol (SWP) [8, 9] . Many practically important communication protocols, such as TCP and HDLC, are based on it.Correctness of the SWP is far from obvious, because the protocol involves a subtle interaction of several distributed components and has a very high degree of parallelism. This is why there have been efforts to verify the protocol formally, by representing it in some specification language. These verification efforts were often supported by such methods as model checking or interactive theorem proving. However, it turned out that formal verification of the SWP is a difficult task, and no consensus has been reached yet on which formal models and methods are best suited for that task. The discussion of some general questions related to the mathematical modeling of the SWP and other communication pro tocols can be found in [9] and [1] .
In the dissertation [3] , a general method for specification and verification of protocols for database management was presented; the method was used to verify several non trivial examples from that field. It would be quite natural to try to generalize that method so it can be used for the verification of the sliding window protocols. Using a modification of our method, in [4] we have already verified a version of the SWP, in which an unusual timing mechanism was used to remove old messages from the channels; this allowed messages in the channels to be reordered. All proofs in [3] and [4] were automated with the veri fication system PVS [6] .
The goal of this work is to consider a standard version of the sliding window protocol, which is aimed at channels that do not allow reordering of messages. This is the version that is usually studied in the lit erature. It corresponds to the protocol with selective repeat of frames from [9] , i.e. a rather complicated version of the SWP in which the sending and receiving windows have an arbitrary size. In this work, we describe the formal specification and verification of this version of the SWP using the system PVS. Note that this work is a substantial generalization of the results presented in our work [5] , in which the size of the receiving window was limited to 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, an informal description of this version of the sliding window protocol is given. In Section 3, we formalize the protocol by a state machine. Section 4 presents specification and verification of the safety property for our protocol. Section 5 gives a brief review of related works. 1 The article is published in the original.
THE SLIDING WINDOW PROTOCOL: INFORMAL DESCRIPTION
Sender and receiver. In the sliding window protocol, there are two main components: the sender and the receiver. The sender obtains an infinite sequence of data from the sending host, which belongs to the network layer that has a higher level than the protocol. We call indivisible segments of data in this sequence frames, and the sequence itself the input sequence. The input sequence should be transmitted to the receiver via an unreliable network. After receiving a frame via the channel, the receiver may decide to accept the frame and eventually deliver it to the receiving host (which also belongs to the network layer). The main correctness condition for the protocol says that the receiver should deliver the frames to the receiving host in the same order they appear in the input sequence.
Messages and channels. In order to transmit a frame, the sender puts it into a frame message together with some additional information and sends it to the frame channel. After the receiver eventually accepts the frame message from this channel, it sends an acknowledgment message for the corresponding frame back to the sender. This acknowledgment message is transmitted via the acknowledgment channel. After receiving an acknowledgment message, the sender can be sure that the corresponding frame has been received by the receiver.
Sequence numbers. The sender sends the frames in the same order in which they appear in the input sequence. However, the frame channel is unreliable, so the receiver may receive these frames in a different order (if receive at all). Therefore it is clear that each frame message should contain some information about the order of the corresponding frame in the input sequence. Such additional information is called a sequence number. If the system under consideration does not impose any restrictions on the size of a frame message, then we can simply send together with each frame its position in the input sequence (such as 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.). This is the situation we consider in this work. Therefore, an infinite range of sequence num bers is used by this version of the protocol.
To acknowledge a frame, the receiver includes into an acknowledgment message the sequence number with which the frame was received. Acknowledgments are "accumulative"; for example, when the receiver acknowledges a frame with the sequence number 3, it means that the frames with the sequence numbers 0, 1 and 2 have already been accepted.
Sending window. At any time, the sender maintains a sequence of sequence numbers corresponding to frames which it is permitted to send. These frames are said to be a part of the sending window. Similarly, the receiver maintains a receiving window of sequence numbers which it is permitted to accept. In many versions of the protocol, including [9] , the sizes of the sending and receiving windows are equal. Here we denote the sizes of the sending and receiving windows by SW and RW respectively, without assuming that SW = RW, which leads to a more general sliding window protocol.
At some point during the execution of the protocol, it is possible that some frames in the beginning of the sending window have already been sent but not yet acknowledged, and the remaining frames have not been sent yet. When an acknowledgment arrives for a frame in the sending window that has already been sent, this frame and all preceding frames are removed from the window (because acknowledgments are accumulative). Simultaneously, the window is shifted forward, so that it again contains at most SW frames. As a result, additional frames can be sent by the sender. Acknowledgments for the frames that fall outside the window are immediately discarded.
If a sent frame is not acknowledged for a long time, it usually means that either this frame or an acknowledgment for it has been lost. To ensure the progress of the protocol, such a frame is eventually resent (sent again). According to [9] , many different strategies exist for sending and resending of frames, which take into account, e.g., the efficient allocation of resources and the need to avoid network conges tion. In this work, we abstract from such details of sending and resending of frames and specify only those restrictions on protocol's behavior that are needed to ensure its safety properties.
Receiving window. During the execution, the receiving window is usually a mix of sequence numbers corresponding to frames that have been accepted out of order and sequence numbers corresponding to "empty spaces", i.e. frames that are still expected. When a frame arrives with a sequence number corre sponding to some "empty space", it is accepted, i.e. inserted in the window, otherwise it is discarded. At any time, if the first element of the receiving window is a frame, it can be delivered to the receiving host, and the window is shifted by one element.
The sequence number of the last delivered frame can be sent back to the sender to acknowledge the frame (in order to simplify the specification, in our version of the protocol we acknowledge the frames that have been delivered instead of the frames that have been accepted). It is not necessary to acknowledge every frame; it is possible to deliver a few frames in a row and then acknowledge only the last of them. If the receiver cannot deliver any new frames for a long time, it may resend the last acknowledgment to ensure the progress of the protocol.
THE SLIDING WINDOW PROTOCOL: SPECIFICATION IN PVS
In our method, the SWP protocol is represented by an abstract state machine with a possibly infinite number of states and transitions between them. The desired properties of the protocol are formalized as logical formulas on all traces of states and actions (transitions) that can be generated by the state machine of the protocol.
More formally, in our method a protocol is defined by the notion of a state, representing the current values of all variables during protocol execution, and a set of actions. The state consists of data and control variables (which are not formally distinguished), each belonging to one of the distributed components. For example, in the sliding window protocol there are four components: the sender, the receiver, the frame channel, and the acknowledgement channel. Each action is executed at one of these distributed compo nents and changes its own variables, and, possibly, also the variables of an adjacent component with which it is interacting. Actions, which may have an arbitrary number of parameters, are specified by a precondi tion and an effect predicate which relates the states before and after the action execution. Execution of a protocol, or a run, is represented by an infinite sequence of the form where s i are states, a i are executed actions, s 0 is the initial state, each s i satisfies the precondition of a i , and every pair (s i , s i + 1 ) corresponds to the effect of a i .
In the PVS specification, in order to implement this definition of runs it is necessary to give the initial state Ini, the precondition Pre, i.e. the Boolean predicate on pairs (s i , a i ), and the effect predicate Eff, i.e. the Boolean predicate on triplets (s i , a i , s i + 1 ). After that, a run r is defined as a pair consisting of an infinite sequence of states st(r) and an infinite sequence of actions act(r) and satisfying the following three prop erties:
(
for each natural index i, we have Pre(st(r)(i), act(r)(i)) = true; (3) for each natural index i, we have Eff(st(r)(i), act(r)(i), st(r)(i + 1)) = true.
In order to specify the sliding window protocol, we should define the structure of states and actions in the protocol. To obtain the executions of the protocol, we also need to replace the initial state Ini and the predicates Pre and Eff by their instances SWIni, SWPre and SWEffect, defined specifically for the SWP.
In the sliding window protocol, there are different ways to model both the sender and the receiver. In our model of the sender, its window "slides" over the infinite input sequence input. We do not specify the structure of the individual frames in the input sequence. Variable first points to the first frame in the send ing window, ftsend denotes the first frame that has not been sent yet, and we should always have first ≤ ftsend ≤ first + SW. Thus, at any moment of time, frames with indices from first to ftsend -1 (if any) have been sent but not yet acknowledged, and frames with indices from ftsend to first + SW -1 (if any) are in the sending window but not sent yet. The complete data structure for the sender looks as follows.
Sender:
ftsend: nat For the receiver, output is the finite output sequence, rwindow is the receiving window with exactly RW elements (which are either frames or empty elements, denoted by ε), ackseqnum is the last delivered sequence number, mayack is a boolean variable which tells whether we are allowed to send the acknowl edgment for the number ackseqnum in this state.
Receiver: should note that frame and nothing are constructors which completely enumerate the elements of the type FrameNothing, whereas frame? and nothing? are recognizers corresponding to these elements. The access to the parameters of constructors is performed by means of destructors. In this case, the constructor frame has only one destructor frid, which obtains the value of the frame. It follows from these definitions that for an arbitrary frame fr we have: frame?(frame(fr)) = true, nothing?(frame(fr)) = false and frid(framefr)) = fr. Both channels are modeled as queues of unbounded capacity which can lose messages. Formally, the frame channel is represented by a finite sequence of frame messages, and the acknowledgment channel is represented by a finite sequence of acknowledgment messages. All messages contain a sequence number, whereas frame messages also contain a frame. The definition of the structure of messages looks as follows.
FrameMessage: (1) seqnum : nat, (2) frame : Frames AckMessage: (1) ackseqnum : nat The complete state of the protocol State consists of data structures for the sender, the receiver and the two channels frameChannel and ackChannel. The initial state of the protocol is defined in such a way that 0 or an empty sequence is assigned to most variables.
State: There are 7 atomic actions in our protocol: two for the sender (send and receiveAck), three for the receiver (receive, deliver and sendAck), one for the frame channel (loseFrame) and one for the acknowl edgment channel (loseAck). Here we only give an informal description of the parameters, the precondition and the effect of these actions.
• send is an action for both the initial sending and re sending of frames. It has a parameter indicating the index of the frame being sent in the input sequence. For this data structure, there is no need to include the frame itself as a parameter, because it can be easily determined from its index in the input sequence.
• receiveAck is an action for receiving of acknowledgements by the sender. It has three parameters: the acknowledgement message ackmes, the Boolean variable accept indicating whether this message is accepted or rejected, and the index of the frame in the input sequence to which this acknowledgement corresponds. The parameter accept is necessary here, because only the accepted messages change the state of the sender, whereas the rejected messages are simply removed from the channel. Such removal of mes sages can also be achieved by applying the action loseAck, but we believe that immediate removal of unwanted messages corresponds more closely to the informal definition of the protocol.
• receive is an action for receiving of frames by the receiver. It has three parameters: the frame message framemes, the Boolean variable accept indicating whether this message is accepted or rejected, and finally the position in the receiving window (i.e. some number from 0 to RW-1) into which the frame from this message should be inserted if the message is accepted. Just as for the action receiveAck, the parameter accept is necessary here, because only the accepted messages change the state of the receiver.
• deliver is an action that delivers the first frame from the receiving window to the receiving host.
• sendAck is an action for sending of an acknowledgement for the last frame delivered to the receiving host.
• loseFrame is an action that removes a message with a particular index from the frame channel.
• loseAck is an action that removes a message with a particular index from the acknowledgement channel.
To better illustrate our method of specification, here we show the precondition and the effect of the action deliver (which has no parameters). The effect of this action will be used in the proof of the safety property presented in the next section. Its result is given in an imperative style close to the specifications of PVS.
The definition of the effect of deliver uses an additional function addLastFrame: if fr is a frame and frFS is a finite sequence of frames, then addLastFrame(fr, frFS) is a finite sequence of frames, in which fr is appended to the end of frFS. Another function shift defines the shift of the receiving window, i.e. it removes the frame being delivered from the beginning of the window, and adds to its end an empty ele ment with a sequence number that exceeds by 1 the directly preceding number. In this definition, it is assumed that the protocol is currently in some state s 0 , from which it makes a transition to a new state s 1 .
Precondition of deliver:
frame ?(frn(rwindow(s0)(0))) Effect of deliver: output := addLastFrame(frid(frn(rwindow(s0)(0))), output(s0)), rwindow := shift(rwindow(s0), (seqnum := seqnum(rwindow(s0)(RW -1)) + 1, frn := nothing)), ackseqnum := seqnum(rwindow(s0)(0)), mayack : = TRUE
It is clear from these definitions that the action deliver can be executed only in the case when there is a frame in the beginning of the receiving window, not an empty element. If this condition is satisfied, the action deliver appends this initial frame to the output sequence. Naturally, this should happen simulta neously with the shift of the receiving window, i.e. the frame being delivered is removed from the window, freeing a place for the insertion of a new frame. Also, the sequence number of the frame being delivered is assigned to the variable ackseqnum, which allows to begin sending acknowledgments for it.
SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF THE SAFETY PROPERTY
The sliding window protocol is correct with respect to safety, if the receiver always delivers the frames to the receiving host in the same order in which they appear in the input sequence. In our model, we prefer to define correctness in terms of states rather than actions. Note that, in each state, the frames already delivered to the receiving host are represented by the output sequence. Therefore, the safety property for a particular state s can be expressed by a predicate which says that the output sequence is the prefix of the input sequence (in PVS, the elements of a sequence are enumerated starting with 0):
Safe(s) = ∀i: i < length(output(s)) ⇒ output(s)(i) = input(s)(i)
As we have already defined earlier, st(r) and act(r) denote the sequence of states and the sequence of actions of a run r, respectively. We define the run r to be safe, if it is safe in its every state (where j is an index of some element of a sequence):
Safety(r) = ∀j: Safe(st(r)(j)) In order to establish the safety property for our protocol, we need to prove in PVS the following theo rem called Main: ∀r: Safety(r) Main The proof of the theorem Main consists of about 22 PVS theorems and lemmas. Checking the proof takes approximately 30 seconds on a personal computer.
Proof of the theorem Main. Like all PVS proofs, our proof is structured as a tree. The root of the tree is the theorem Main, and most of its leaves are lemmas IniLem, PreLem and EffLem, which will be given below. These lemmas, which we call elementary lemmas, follow directly from the definition of runs as it was given in the previous section. Note that in that definition we should replace the initial state Ini and the predicates Pre and Eff by SWinit, SWPre and SWEffect, i.e. their instances for this particular protocol.
The elementary lemma IniLem expresses that the first state in any run should be equal to the initial state. It is easy to see that it follows directly from clause 1 in the definition of runs. ∀r: st(r)(0) = SWinit IniLem The lemma PreLem means that each action with an index i should be allowed in the state with the same index by the precondition predicate. It follows from clause 2 in the definition of runs.
∀r, i: SWPre(st(r)(i), act(r)(i))
PreLem Finally, the elementary lemma EffLem expresses that each action with an index i should transform the state with the same index according to the effect predicate. It follows from clause 3 in the definition of runs.
∀r, i: SWEffect(st(r)(i), act(r)(i), st(r)(i + 1))
EffLem Now we continue with the proof of the theorem. Let r be an arbitrary run. Let us denote as output r (i) and input r (i) the output and the input sequences in a state with the index i, respectively, and the length of the output sequence as LO r (i). The proof is by induction on the length of the output sequence. We proved by induction on k the following theorem MainInduct, which expresses the relation between the length of the output sequence and the safety property.
It is obvious that MainInduct implies our main theorem. The basis of the induction is trivial, because a sequence of length 0 has no elements. It remains to prove the induction step. Suppose that the theorem has been proved for any length of the output sequence not greater than k, and that we are currently in a state with the index i such that LO r (i) = k + 1. In order to prove Safe(st(r)(i)), we need 4 additional lemmas L1, L2, L3, and L4, the proofs of which are not considered here. The lemma L1 expresses that the output sequence can only be changed by the action deliver:
The lemma L2 expresses that if the current length of the output sequence is equal to some arbitrary nat ural number n + 1, then there was a preceding state in this run, in which the length of the output sequence increased from n to n + 1, and the output sequence remained the same in the interval from the resulting state to the current state:
Applying the lemmas L1 and L2, we obtain that there exists an index l such that l < i, LO r (l) = k, LO r (l + 1) = k + 1, act(r)(l) = deliver and output r (l + 1) = output r (i). Thus in a state with the index l we increased the length of the output sequence from k to the current value of k + 1, and after this increase the output sequence remained the same. We can now apply the induction hypothesis to the state with the index l, which gives us Safe(st(r)(l)). Now we split the proof of Safe(st(r)(i)) into two parts (*) and (**):
First we prove the part (**). Its proof is based on the following lemma L3, which expresses that the input sequence remains the same in all states of any run:
L 3 Applying the lemma L3, we obtain input r (l + 1) = input r (i). But we have already proved that output r (l + 1) = output r (i). So both the input sequence and output sequence are the same in the state with the index i as in the state with the index l + 1. Therefore if the output sequence is the prefix of the input sequence in the state with the index l + 1, this relation between them still holds in the state with the index i. This completes the proof of the part (**).
In the rest of the proof, we denote as Input r the input sequence in any state of a run r, and as Input r (i) its element with the index i.
Next we prove the part (*). Its proof uses the additional lemma L4. Let us introduce the following abbreviations: for a run r and a state in it with an index i, let SNum r (i, m) denote the sequence number that is located in the position m in the receiving window (where m < RW), and let Frn r (i, m) denote the frame or the empty element corresponding to this sequence number.
SNum r (i, m) = seqnum(rwindow(st(r)(i))(m))
Frn r (i, m) = frn(rwindow(st(r)(i))(m)) Using these abbreviations, we define the predicate SafeRWindow r . Its informal meaning is as follows: it is satisfied in a state with an index i, if for an arbitrary natural number m (where m < RW), the sequence number that is located in the position m in the receiving window is equal to the sum of m and the current length of the output sequence. Also, if a frame (not an empty element) corresponds to this sequence num ber, then this frame is an element of the input sequence with the same index (equal to the sum of m and the current value of LO r ). The lemma L4 expresses the fact that any state of any run has a safe receiving window (the parameter k is used in the lemma's definition in order to simplify proving it by induction):
Let us now consider the proof of the part (*) of the theorem MainInduct. We already know that the action deliver was performed in a state with the index l. Applying the elementary lemma PreLem for this action, we obtain that in the state st(r)(l), a frame was occupying the position 0 in the receiving window, CHKLIAEV, NEPOMNIASCHY not an empty element. Applying now the elementary lemma EffLem for the same action, as well as the definition of the abbreviation Frn r , we obtain: output r (l + 1) = addLastFrame(frid (Frn r (l, 0) ), output r (l)). We can now use the lemma L4 with i = l and k = LO r (l). This implies that the state with the index l has a safe receiving window. If in the predicate SafeRWindow r we instantiate m = 0, this gives us frid(Frn r (l, 0)) = Input r (LO r (l)). But we already know that LO r (l) = k, and this leads to the equality output r (l + 1) = addLastFrame(Input r (k), output r (l)). The definition of the function addLastFrame, together with Safe(st(r)(l)) = true and LO r (l) = k, now leads us to the conclusion that in a state with the index l + 1 the output sequence is still the prefix of the input sequence. This completes the proof of the part (*) and of the whole theorem Main.
CONCLUSIONS
A significant number of publications have already been dedicated to verification of the sliding window protocol, so here we can mention only a few of them. In one of the first papers on the SWP protocol [8] , only an informal proof of correctness is given. A formal verification of the protocol was given in [2] with the use of process algebra, and the proof of correctness was automated with PVS. However, their proof is somewhat incomplete, because it uses several complicated results from the field of process algebra which have not been proved in PVS.
An interesting verification of the sliding window protocol was also presented in [7] . Their approach to specification of the protocol (based on extended automata) is somewhat similar to the method presented in this paper, and the proof of correctness property was also automated with help of the PVS system. How ever, it should be noted that in [7] the frames are modeled by natural numbers, whereas we represent them by an arbitrary datatype. This difference makes our modeling considerably more general. Compared to [7] , our specification uses more natural data structures. For example, most sequences in our specification are finite, whereas in [7] only infinite sequences are used. Note that the use of finite sequences (which are easily programmed using arrays) makes our specification closer to possible implementations of the protocol.
To simplify the proofs, unlike [9] , we assume in this work that there is no limit on message size in the protocol under consideration. Therefore, in this version the sender uses the original index of each frame in the input sequence when it transmits the frame, instead of its remainder with respect to some modulus. Note that the same simplification of the protocol is used in the paper [7] , and also some other works ded icated to verification of the SWP.
